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ABSTRACT
Secure multi-party computing, also called secure function evalua-
tion, has been extensively studied in classical cryptography. We
consider the extension of this task to computation with quantum
inputs and circuits. Our protocols are information-theoretically se-
cure, i.e. no assumptions are made on the computational power
of the adversary. For the weaker task of verifiable quantum secret
sharing, we give a protocol which tolerates any t < n/4 cheating
parties (out of n). This is shown to be optimal. We use this new
tool to show how to perform any multi-party quantum computation
as long as the number of dishonest players is less than n/6.
Keywords
Quantum cryptography, multi-party protocols, secure function eval-
uation, distributed computing
1. INTRODUCTION
Secure distributed protocols have been an important and fruitful
area of research for modern cryptography. In this setting, there is a
group of participants who wish to perform some joint task, despite
the fact that some of the participants in the protocol may cheat in
order to obtain additional information or corrupt the outcome.
We investigate a quantum version of an extensively studied clas-
sical problem, secure multi-party computation (or secure function
evaluation), first introduced by [13]. A multi-party quantum com-
puting (MPQC) protocol allows n participants P1, P2, . . . , Pn to
compute an n-input quantum circuit in such a way that each party
Pi is responsible for providing one of the input states. The output
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of the circuit is broken into n components H1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Hn, and
Pi receives the output Hi. Note that the inputs to this protocol are
arbitrary quantum states—the player providing an input need only
have it in his possession; he does not need to know a classical de-
scription of it. Moreover, unlike in the classical case, we cannot
assume without loss of generality that the result of the computa-
tion will be broadcast. Instead, each player in the protocol receives
some part of the output.
Informally, we require two security conditions:
- Soundness and Completeness: no coalition of t or fewer cheaters
should be able to affect the outcome of the protocol beyond their
ability to choose their inputs.
- Privacy: no coalition of t or fewer cheaters should learn anything
beyond what they can deduce from their initial knowledge of their
input and from their part of the output.
Verifiable Quantum Secret Sharing. In order to construct MPQC
protocols, we consider a subtask which we call verifiable quantum
secret sharing. In classical cryptography, a verifiable secret sharing
scheme [9] is a two phase protocol with one player designated as
the “dealer”. After the first phase (commitment), the dealer shares
a secret amongst the players. In the second phase (recovery), the
players reconstruct the value publicly.
The natural quantum version of this allows a dealer to share a
state ρ (possibly unknown to him but nonetheless in his posses-
sion). Because quantum information cannot be cloned, we cannot
require that the state be reconstructed publicly; instead, the recov-
ery phase also has a designated player, the reconstructor R. We
require that, despite any malicious actions by ≤ t players:
- Soundness: As long as R is honest and the dealer passes the com-
mitment phase successfully, then there is a unique quantum state
which can be recovered by R.
- Completeness: WhenD is honest, then he always passes the com-
mitment phase. Moreover, when R is also honest, then the value
recovered by R is exactly D’s input ρ.
- Privacy: When D is honest, no other player learns info about D’s
input until the recovery step.
Note that for quantum data, the privacy condition is redundant:
any information obtained about the shared state would imply some
disturbance of that state, contradicting the completeness require-
ment.
Contributions. We give a protocol for verifiable quantum secret
sharing that tolerates any number t < n/4 of cheaters. We show
that this is optimal, by proving that VQSS is impossible when t ≥
n/4. Based on techniques from fault-tolerant quantum comput-
ing, we use our VQSS protocol to construct a multi-party quantum
computation protocol tolerating any t < n/6 cheaters. (MPQC is
similar to standard fault-tolerance but with a different error model,
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see Previous Work). Our protocols run in time polynomial in both
n, the number of players, and k, the security parameter. The error
of the protocols is exponentially small in k.
Beyond these specific results, there are a number of conceptual
contributions of this paper to the theory of quantum cryptographic
protocols. We provide a simple, general framework for defining
and proving the security of distributed quantum protocols in terms
of equivalence to an ideal protocol involving a third party. This fol-
lows the definitions for classical multi-party protocols. The anal-
ysis of our protocols leads us to consider various notions of local
“neighborhoods” of quantum states, and more generally of quan-
tum codes. We discuss three notions of a neighborhood. The no-
tion most often used for the analysis of quantum error correction
and fault-tolerance is insufficient for our needs, but we show that
a very natural generalization (specific to so-called “CSS” codes) is
adequate for our purposes. Along the way, we provide modified
versions of the classical sharing protocols of [8]. The new property
our protocols have is that dealers do not need to remember the ran-
domness they use when constructing shares to distribute to other
players. This allows them to replace a random choice of coins with
the superposition over all such choices.
1.1 Previous Work
Classical MPC. Multi-party computing was introduced by Goldre-
ich, Micali and Wigderson [13], who showed that under computa-
tional assumptions, secure multi-party evaluation of any function
was possible tolerating any minority of cheating players, i.e. if and
only if t < n
2
. If one assumes pairwise secure channels but no
computational assumptions, then one can compute any function se-
curely if and only if t < n/3 [5, 8]. If one further assumes the
availability of a secure broadcast channel, then one can in fact tol-
erate t < n/2, and no more ([21, 3, 11]). All of these protocols
rely on verifiable secret sharing as a basic tool. Our solution draws
most heavily on the techniques of Chaum, Cre´peau and Damga˚rd
[8].
Beyond these basic protocols, much work has focused on finding
proper definitions of security, e.g. [14, 4, 18, 20, 6]. We adopt a
simple definition based on the initial definitions of Canetti.
Quantum Secret Sharing. Relatively little work exists on multi-
party cryptographic protocols with quantum data. Secret sharing
with a quantum secret was first studied by Cleve et al. [10], who
showed an equivalence with quantum error-correcting codes (QECC).
Their scheme is the basis of our protocols. Chau [7] deals with
classical computations, but also mentions the problem of verifiable
quantum secret sharing as an open question.
Fault-tolerant Quantum Computing. The goal of FTQC is to
tolerate non-malicious faults occurring within a single computer.
One assumes that at every stage in the computation, every qubit
in the circuit has some known probability p of suffering a random
error, i.e. of becoming completely scrambled. Moreover, errors are
assumed to occur independently of each other and of the data in the
computation.
One can view multi-party computation as fault-tolerant comput-
ing with a different error model, one that is suited to distributed
computing. The MPQC model is weaker in some respects since
we assume that errors will always occur in the same, limited num-
ber of positions, i.e. errors will only occur in the systems of the
t corrupted players. In other respects, the error model of MPQC is
stronger: in our setting errors may be maliciously coordinated. In
particular, they will not be independently placed, and they may in
fact depend on the data of the computation—the adversaries will
use any partial information known about the other players’ data,
as well as information about their own data, to attempt to corrupt
the computation. For example, several FTQC algorithms rely on the
fact that at certain points in the computation, at most one error is
likely to occur. Such algorithms will fail when errors are placed
adversarially. Techniques from FTQC are nonetheless useful for
multi-party computing. We will draw most heavily on techniques
due to Aharonov and Ben-Or [2].
1.2 Definitions and Model
In this paper, we use a simple simulation-based framework for
proving the security of quantum protocols, similar to early classical
definitions. We specify a task by giving a protocol for implement-
ing it in an ideal model where players have access to a trusted third
party T T P. We prove a given protocol secure by showing a simu-
lator which translates any attack in the real-world protocol into an
(almost) equally successful attack in the ideal model.
We assume that every pair of participants is connected by per-
fect (i.e. authenticated, unjammable, secret) quantum and classi-
cal channels, and that there is a classical authenticated broadcast
channel to which all players have access. Because we will always
consider settings where t < n
2
, we can also assume that players can
perform classical multi-party computations securely [11]1. The ad-
versary is an arbitrary quantum algorithm (or family of circuits) A
(not necessarily polynomial time), and so the security of our proto-
cols does not rely on computational assumptions.
The real and ideal models, as well as the notion of security, are
specified more carefully in [22]. In this paper, we use the following
informal specifications of the ideal protocols. The real protocols
are secure if they succeed in simulating the ideal ones.
Multi-party Quantum Computation. All players hand their in-
puts to the T T P , who runs the desired circuit and hands back the
outputs. Note that the only kind of cheating which is possible is
that cheaters may choose their own input. In particular, cheaters
cannot force the protocol to abort.
Verifiable Quantum Secret Sharing. In the sharing phase, the
dealer gives his secret system to the trusted party. In the reconstruc-
tion phase, the T T P sends the secret system to the reconstructor
R. The only catch is that in the ideal model, honest players should
not learn the identity of R until after the first phase has finished
(otherwise, D could simply send the secret state to R in the first
phase without violating the definition).
1.3 Preliminaries
We present the notation necessary for reading the protocols and
proofs in this paper. For a more detailed explanation of the relevant
background, see [22] or a textbook such as [19].
We will work with p-dimensional quantum systems, for some
prime p > n. Such a system is called a qupit, and the “compu-
tational” basis states are labelled by elements in F = Zp. We
will also be working in the Fourier basis, which is given by the
unitary transformation F|a〉 7→
∑
b
ωab|b〉. A basis for the oper-
ators on a qupit is given by the p2 Pauli operators XaZb, where
X|a〉 = |a + 1〉 , Z|a〉 = ωa|a〉, and ω = exp(2πi/p). Tensor
products of these operators yield the Pauli basis for the set of opera-
tors on a register of qupits. The weight of a tensor product operator
is the number of components in which it is not the identity I.
Quantum Codes. The error-correcting codes used in this paper
are quantum CSS codes. These are defined via two classical linear
1In fact, even the assumption of a broadcast channel is not strictly
necessary, since t < n
3
in our setting.
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codes V,W ⊆ Znp such that V ⊥ ⊆ W . If we denote W (q) =
span{|w〉 : w ∈ W } for a classical code W , then we can write
the CSS code as C = V (q) ∩ FW (q). Thus, C is the set of states
of n qubits which yield a codeword of V when measured in the
computational basis and a codeword of W when measured in the
Fourier basis.
Specifically, we will use quantum Reed-Solomon codes from
[2]. We specify a quantum RS code by a single parameter δ <
n/2. The classical Reed-Solomon code V δ is the set of all vec-
tors qˆ = (q(1), q(2), . . . , q(n)), where q is any univariate poly-
nomial of degree at most δ. The related code V δ0 is the subset
of V δ corresponding to polynomials which interpolate to 0 at the
point 0. That is: V δ = {qˆ : q ∈ F [x] : deg(q) ≤ δ} and
V δ0 = {qˆ : deg(q) ≤ δ and q(0) = 0} ⊆ V δ . The code V δ has
minimum distance d = n− δ, and an efficient error correction pro-
cedure. Let δ′ = n − δ − 1. There are constants d1, ..., dn ∈ Zp
such that the dual of the code V δ is just the code V δ′0 , rescaled
by di in the ith coordinate; similarly, the dual of V δ0 is a rescaled
version of V δ
′
. Denote these duals by W δ
′
0 ,W
δ′
, respectively.
The quantum code Cδ for parameter δ is the CSS code obtained
from codes V = V δ and W = W δ
′
. It encodes a single qupit, and
has minimum distance δ + 1 (thus, it corrects t = ⌊δ/2⌋ errors).
Moreover, errors can be corrected efficiently, given the syndrome
of a corrupted codeword, i.e. the V syndrome measured in the
computational basis and the W syndrome measured in the Fourier
basis.
Transversal Operations. A nice result from fault-tolerant com-
puting [2, 15] is that one can in fact perform many operations on
data encoded by a quantum RS code using only local operations and
classical information transmitted between the components. Con-
sider the following gates:
1. Shift: Xc : |a〉 7→ |a+ c〉,
2. SUM: (c-X) : |a, b〉 7→ |a, a+ b〉,
3. Scalar multiplication: 0 6= c ∈ F , Sc : |a〉 7→ |ac〉,
4. Phase Shift: Zc : |a〉 7→ wca|a〉,
5. Fourier Transform: Fr : |a〉 7→ 1√p
∑
b∈F w
rab|b〉,
6. Toffoli (Multiplication): |a〉|b〉|c〉 7→ |a〉|b〉|c+ ab〉.
These gates are universal [2], in the sense that a sequence of these
gates can approximate any unitary operation with arbitrary accu-
racy. Beyond these, in order to simulate arbitrary quantum circuits
one should also be able to introduce qupits in some known state
(say |0〉), as well as to discard qupits. For any CSS code, the gates
1 through 4 from the set above can be implemented transversally,
that is using only local operations which affect the same component
of two codewords. Measurement and the remaining two operations
can be performed almost transversally.
Measurement. For a quantum RS code, measuring each compo-
nent of the encoding of |s〉 yields a vector qˆ = (q(1), ..., q(n))
where q(0) = s. This operation is not quite transversal since
after the qupit-wise measurement, the classical information must
be gathered together in order to extract the measurement result.
Nonetheless, it can tolerate arbitrary corrupton of δ/2 of the po-
sitions in the codeword if classical error correction is first applied
to the vector of measurement results.
Fourier and Toffoli gates. For CSS codes, applying the Fourier
transform transversally maps data encoded with the codes V,W to
the Fourier transform of that data, encoded with the dual code C˜
defined via the codes W,V . For quantum RS codes, rescaling each
component of the dual code of Cδ produces the code Cδ
′
. This
allows one to perform the map ECδ |ψ〉 7→ ECδ′ (F|ψ〉), where EC
is the encoding map for a code C.
When n = 2δ + 1, we have δ′ = δ, so the Fourier transform is
in fact transversal, but the Toffoli gate is difficult to perform.
When n = 3δ + 1, neither the Fourier transform nor the Toffoli
gate is transversal, but they can both be reduced to degree reduction
via transversal operations [2]. Degree reduction maps an arbitrary
state |ψ〉 encoded using Cδ
′
to |ψ〉 encoded with Cδ .
The circuit we use for degree reduction is due to Gottesman and
Bennett [15]. We start with one block encoded using Cδ′ (system
H1), and an ancilla block in the state ECδ (
∑
|a〉) (system H2).
Perform a SUM gate from H2 to H1 (this can be done transver-
sally by a property of the codes Cδ). Measure H1 in the compu-
tational basis, obtaining b, and apply XbS−1 to H2. The system
H2 now contains the data, encoded using Cδ . This entire proce-
dure can be performed transversally except for the measurement
step. However, as noted above, measurement requires only classi-
cal communication between the components.
2. NEIGHBORHOODS OF QUANTUM
CODES
One of the ideas behind classical multi-party computing proto-
cols is to ensure that data is encoded in a state that remains “close”
to a codeword, differing only on those positions held by cheaters
(call that set B). For classical codes, “close” means that the real
word v should differ from a codeword only on B, so that any er-
rors introduced by cheaters are correctable. For a code W , let the
B-neighborhood WB be the set of vectors differing from a code-
word of W by positions in B, i.e.,
WB = {v : ∃w ∈W s.t. supp(v −w) ∈ B} .
Equivalently, one can define WB as the set of words obtained by
distributing a (correct) codeword to all players, and then having all
players send their shares to some (honest) reconstructor R.
For quantum codes, there is more than one natural definition
of the neighborhood corresponding to a set B of positions. Let
{1, ..., n} be partitioned according to two sets A,B. We say a
mixed state ρ′ is “in” C if all states in the mixture lie in C, i.e.
Tr(PCρ′) = 1 where PC is the projector onto C. We consider three
definitions of a “B-neighborhood” of a CSS code C. Let ρ be an
arbitrary state of the coding space.
1. ρ differs from a state in C only by some quantum superoperator
O acting only on B:
NB(C) = {ρ : ∃ρ
′ in C,∃Os.t. ρ = O(ρ′)}.
2. ρ cannot be distinguished from a state in C by looking only at
positions in A.
STB(C) = {ρ : ∃ρ
′ in C s.t. TrB(ρ) = TrB(ρ′)}.
3. Specifically for CSS codes, one can require that the state ρ pass
checks on A in both bases, i.e. that measuring either the VB
syndrome in the computational basis, or the WB syndrome in
the Fourier basis, yields 0. The set of states which pass this test
is: CB = V (q)B ∩ F
⊗nW (q)B .
In general, these notions form a strict hierarchy:
NB(C) ( STB(C) ( CB . Only notion (3) is always a subspace
(see [22] for details).
In the analysis of quantum error correction and fault-tolerance
schemes, it is sufficient to consider notion (1), for two reasons. On
one hand, one starts from a correctly encoded state. On the other
hand, the errors introduced by the environment will be independent
of the encoded data (and in fact they must be for error correction to
be possible at all in that context).
3
In our setting, however, we cannot make such assumptions. The
cheaters might possess states which are entangled with the data in
the computation, and so the errors they introduce will not be inde-
pendent of that data. Instead, we show that our verifiable sharing
protocol guarantees a condition similar to notion (3) (see Lemma 3.1).
In order to provide some intuition for the proofs of Section 3, we
characterize notion (3) below.
Well-Definedness of Decoding for CB . The set CB is a subspace,
since it is defined in terms of measurement outcomes. More partic-
ularly, it is spanned by the states of NB(C):
LEMMA 2.1. If ρ is in CB = V (q)B ∩ F⊗nW (q)B , then we can
write ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|, where |ψi〉 =
∑
j
cijEj |φij〉, the Ej
are Pauli operators on B and |φij〉 ∈ C.
Proof: To check if ρ is in CB , we measure the VB syndrome in
the computational basis and the WB syndrome in the Fourier basis.
However, the distribution on this outcome measurement will not
change if we first measure the V and W syndromes, i.e. if we first
make a measurement which projects ρ into one of the subspaces
EjC (i.e. ρ maps to ρ′ = PjρPj with probability Tr (Pjρ), where
Pj is the projector for the space EjC).
The new state ρ′ lies completely in one of the spaces EjC. How-
ever, EjC is either contained in CB (if there is an operator equiva-
lent to Ej which acts only on B) or orthogonal to CB (if no such
operator exists).
Thus Tr (Pjρ) = 0 for all Ej which act on more than B. Hence
ρ is a mixture of states |ψi〉 each of which is a linear combination
of elements of the spaces {EjC}, where Ej acts only on B. ✷
This has a useful corollary, namely that decoding is well-defined
for states in CB . Formally, there are two natural “reconstruction
operators” for extracting the secret out of a state which has been
shared among several players. Suppose that C has distance d >
2t+ 1 and |B| ≤ t. First, D is the decoding operator for the error-
correcting code C, which would be applied by an honest player
holding all of the shares. For any operator Ej of weight less than
t and for any state E|φ〉 in C, we have DEjE|φ〉 = |φ〉 ⊗ |j〉
(i.e. the error is not only corrected but also identified). It will
then discard the system containing the syndrome information |j〉.
Second, RI is the “ideal recovery operator”, defined by identifying
the set B of cheaters and applying the simple interpolation circuit
to any set of n − 2t good players’ positions (this corresponds to
erasure recovery).
PROPOSITION 2.2. For any state ρ in CB , the state RI(ρ) is
well-defined and is equal to D(ρ).
Our protocols guarantee conditions similar to CB , and well-definedness
is essential for proving simulatability.
Proof: Consider a particular basis state EjE|a〉. The decoding op-
eratorD will produce the state |a〉|j〉, since errors of weight at most
t can be identified uniquely. The ideal operator RI will extract the
encoded state |a〉. Without loss of generality, the ideal recovery
operator will replace |a〉 with |0〉, the final output |a〉 ⊗ EjE|0〉.
In both cases, the output can be written as |a〉 tensored with
some ancilla whose state depends only on the syndrome j (and
which identifies j uniquely). Once that state is traced out, the out-
puts of both operators will be identical. Another way to see this
is that the ideal operator can simulate the real operator: one can
go from the output of the ideal operator to that of the real oper-
ator by applying a transformation which only affects the ancilla.
For a state ρ expressed as in Lemma 2.1, the final outcome will be
ρ′ =
∑
ij
pi|cij |
2|φij〉〈φij |. ✷
3. A TWO LEVEL VQSS PROTOCOL
In this section we define a two-tiered protocol for VQSS. It is
based on the VQSS protocols of [8] as well as on the literature on
quantum fault-tolerance and error correction, most notably on [2].
Detailed proofs for the claims of this section are in [22]. However,
some intuition is given by the proofs of Section 2.
3.1 Sharing Shares: 2-GOOD Trees
In the VSS protocol of [8], the dealer D takes his secret, splits
it into n shares and gives the ith component to player i. Player i
then shares this secret by splitting it into n shares and giving the
jth share to player j. Thus, there are n2 total shares, which can be
thought of as the leaves of a tree with depth 2 and fan-out n: each
leaf is a share; the ith branch corresponds to the shares created by
player i, and the root corresponds to the initial shares created by
the dealer. Player j holds the jth leaf in each branch of this tree.
We will run a cut-and-choose protocol in order to guarantee some
kind of consistency of the distributed shares.
During the protocol we accumulate n+1 sets of apparent cheaters:
one set B for the dealer (this corresponds to a set of branches em-
anating from the root), and one set Bi for each player i (this cor-
responds to a subset of the leaves in branch i). These sets all have
size at most t. At the end of the protocol, we want to guarantee
certain invariants. Say V has minimum distance > 2t, and each
codeword corresponds to a single value a ∈ Zp.
DEFINITION 1 (2-GOOD TREES). We say a tree of n2 field el-
ements is 2-GOOD with respect to the code V and the setsB,B1, ..., Bn
if:
1. For each i 6∈ C (i.e., corresponding to an honest player), we
have Bi ⊆ C, i.e. all apparent cheaters are real cheaters.
2. For each branch i 6∈ B, the shares held by the honest players
not in Bi should all be consistent with some codeword in V , i.e.
the vector of all shares should be in VBi∪C , where C is the set
of cheating players.
N.B.: Because there are at most t players in Bi and at most t
cheaters, there are at least d + 1 ≤ n − 2t honest players re-
maining, and so the polynomial above is uniquely defined. This
guarantees that for each branch i 6∈ B, there is a unique value
ai ∈ F which is obtained by interpolating the shares of the
honest players not in Bi.
3. For i 6∈ B, the values ai defined by the previous property are
all consistent with a codeword of V (i.e. the vector (a1, ..., an)
is in VB).
We will abbreviate this as 2-GOODV , when the sets B, B1,...,Bn
are clear from the context.
3.2 VQSS Protocol
The VQSS protocol is described in Protocols 1 and 2. Intuitively,
it guarantees that a tree of quantum shares would yield a 2-GOOD
tree of classical values if measured in either the computational basis
or the Fourier basis. We use the codes V = V δ = V δ
′
and W =
W δ = W δ
′
, with n = 4t+1, δ = δ′ = 2t, although there is in fact
no need to do this: the protocol will work for any CSS code with
distance at least 2t + 1, so long as the codes V,W are efficiently
decodable.
The protocol can be tweaked for efficiency. The final protocol
takes three rounds. Each player sends and receives O(n + log 1
ǫ
)
qubits, and the broadcast channel is used O
(
n(n+ log 1
ǫ
)
)
times
overall, where ǫ is the soundness error of the protocol (this requires
setting k = n+ log( 1
ǫ
)).
Why is this a secure VQSS protocol? We want to show that the
protocol is equivalent to the “ideal model”, where at sharing time
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PROTOCOL 1 (VQSS—SHARING PHASE). Dealer D gets as input a quantum system S to share.
• Sharing:
1. The dealer D prepares (k + 1)2 systems of n qupits each, called Sℓ,m (for ℓ = 0, ..., k and m = 0, ..., k):
(a) Encodes S using C in S0,0.
(b) Prepares k systems S0,1, ..., S0,k in the state
∑
a∈F EC|a〉 =
∑
v∈V |v〉.
(c) Prepares k(k + 1) systems Sℓ,m, for ℓ = 1, ..., k and m = 0, ..., k, each in the state |0¯〉 = ∑v∈V0 |v〉.
(d) For each of the (k + 1)2 systems Sℓ,m, D sends the ith component (denoted S(i)ℓ,m) to player i.
2. Each player i, for each ℓ,m = 0, ...k:
(a) Encodes the received system S(i)ℓ,m using C into an n qupit system Sℓ,m,i.
(b) Sends the jth component S(j)ℓ,m,i to player j.
• Verification:
1. Get public random values b1, ..., bk ∈R F . For each ℓ = 0, ..., k, m = 1, ..., k, each player j:
(a) Applies the SUM gate (c-Xbm ) to his shares of the systems Sℓ,0,i and Sℓ,m,i.
(b) Measures his share of Sℓ,m,i and broadcasts the result (i.e. each player broadcasts k(k + 1)n values).
(c) For each i ∈ {1, ..., n}, players update the set Bi based on the broadcast values: there are (k + 1)kn broadcast
words wℓ,m,i. Applying classical decoding to each of these yields min-weight error vectors eℓ,m,i with supports
Bℓ,m,i. Set Bi = ∪ℓ,mBℓ,m,i. If there are too many errors, add i to the global set B.
(d) Furthermore, players do the same at the root level: for all i 6∈ B, there is an interpolated value ai which corresponds
to the decoded codeword from the previous step. Players also decode the codeword (a1, ..., an) and update B
accordingly (i.e. by adding any positions where errors occur to B).
2. All players apply the Fourier transform F to their shares.
3. Get public random values b′1, ..., b′k ∈R F . For ℓ = 1, ..., k, each player j:
(a) Applies the SUM gate (c-Xb′ℓ) to his shares of the systems S0,0,i and Sℓ,0,i.
(b) Measures his share of Sℓ,0,i and broadcasts the result (i.e. each player broadcasts kn values).
(c) For each i ∈ {1, ..., n}, players update Bi and B based on the broadcast values (as in Step 1c).
[Note: the sets B and B1, ..., Bn are cumulative throughout the protocol.]
4. All players apply the inverse transform F−1 to their shares of S0,0.
• The remaining shares (i.e. the components of the n systems S0,0,i) form the sharing of the state ρ.
PROTOCOL 2 (VQSS—RECONSTRUCTION PHASE). Player j sends his share of each of the systems S0,0,i to the receiver
R, who runs the following decoding algorithm:
1. For each branch i: Determine if there is a set B˜i such that Bi ⊆ B˜i, |B˜i| ≤ t and the shares of S0,0,i lie in CB˜i .
If not, add i to B. Otherwise, correct errors on B˜i and decode to obtain a system S′i.
2. Apply interpolation to any set of n− 2t points not in B. Output the result S′.
the dealer sends his secret system S to a trusted outside party, and
at reveal time the trusted party sends S to the designated receiver.
To do that, we will use two main technical claims.
Soundness. We must show that at the end of the protocol, if the
dealer passes all tests then there is an well-defined “shared state”
which will be recovered by the dealer. To do so, we guarantee a
property similar to CC (notion (3) of Section 2).
LEMMA 3.1. The system has high fidelity to the following state-
ment: “Either the dealer is caught (i.e. |B| > t) or measuring all
shares in the computational (resp. Fourier) basis would yield a
2-GOOD tree with respect to the code V (resp. W ).”
Proof of this is via a “quantum-to-classical” reduction, similar to
that of [17]. First, checks in the computational and Fourier bases
don’t interfere with each other, since they commute for CSS codes.
Second, in a given basis, we can assume w.l.o.g. that all ancillae are
first measured in that basis, reducing to a classical analysis similar
to [8].
Ideal Reconstruction. In order to prove soundness carefully, we
define an ideal interpolation circuit RI for 2-GOOD trees: pick the
first n− 2t honest players not in B, say i1, ..., in−2t. For each ij ,
pick n − 2t honest players not in Bij and apply the normal inter-
polation circuit (i.e. erasure-recovery circuit) for the code to their
shares to get some qupit Rij . Applying the interpolation circuit
again, we extract some system S which we take to be the output of
the ideal interpolation.
The real recovery operator D is given by Protocol 2. The follow-
ing lemma then applies, following essentially from Proposition 2.2.
LEMMA 3.2. Given a tree of qupits which is 2-GOOD in both
bases, the outputs of RI and D are the same. In particular, this
means that no changes made by cheaters to their shares can affect
the outcome of D.
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 show that there is essentially a unique state
which will be recovered in the reconstruction phase when the re-
ceiver R is honest.
Completeness. As discussed earlier, the protocol is considered
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complete if when the dealer is honest, the state that is recovered
by an honest reconstructor is exactly the dealer’s input state. The
key property is that when the dealer D is honest, the effect of the
verification phase on the shares which never pass through cheaters’
hands is the identity.
Consider the case where the dealer’s input is a pure state |ψ〉.
On one hand, we can see by inspection that an honest dealer will
always pass the protocol. Moreover, since the shares that only go
through honest players’ hands remain unchanged, it must be that
if some state is reconstructed, then that state is |ψ〉, since the ideal
reconstruction operator uses only those shares. Finally, we know
that since the dealer passed the protocol the overall tree must be
2-GOOD in both bases, and so some value will be reconstructed.
Thus, on input |ψ〉, an honest reconstructor will reconstruct |ψ〉.
We have proved:
LEMMA 3.3. If D and R are honest, and the dealer’s input is
a pure state |ψ〉, then R will reconstruct a state ρ with fidelity 1−
2−Ω(k) to the state |ψ〉.
Not surprisingly, this lemma also guarantees the privacy of the
dealer’s input. By a strong form of the no cloning theorem, any in-
formation the cheaters could obtain would cause some disturbance,
at least for a subset of the inputs. Thus, the protocol is in fact also
private.
Simulatability. The claims above show that the protocol satisfies
an intuitive notion of security. In this section we sketch a proof
that the protocol satisfies a more formal notion of security: it is
equivalent to a simple ideal model protocol. The equivalence is
statistical, that is the outputs of the real and ideal protocols may
not be identical but will have very high fidelity to one another.
THEOREM 3.4. Protocols 1 and 2 are a statistically secure VQSS
scheme.
The ideal protocol is sketched in Section 1.2. To show equiva-
lence, we will give a transformation that takes an adversary A1 for
our protocol and turns it into an adversary A2 for the ideal proto-
col. To give the transformation, we exhibit a simulator S which
acts as an intermediary between A1 and the ideal protocol, making
A1 believe that it is experiencing the real protocol.
The idea is that the simulator will simulate the regular VQSS pro-
tocol either on input provided by a cheating dealer or on bogus data
|0〉, and then extract and/or change the shared state as needed.
We give a sketch of the simulation procedure in Algorithm 1.
Why does this simulation work?
1. When D is cheating:
(a) When R is cheating, the simulation is trivially faithful, since
there is no difference between the simulation and the real pro-
tocol: S runs the normal sharing protocol, then runs the in-
terpolation circuit, sending the result to T T P . In the recon-
struction phase, S gets the same state back from T T P , and
runs the interpolation circuit in reverse. Thus, the two execu-
tions of the interpolation circuit cancel out.
(b) When R is honest, the faithfulness of the simulation comes
from Lemma 3.2: in the real protocol, R outputs the result of
the regular decoding operator. In the simulation, R gets the
output of the ideal interpolation. Since the shared state has
high fidelity to a 2-GOOD tree (by Lemma 3.1), the outputs
will be essentially identical in both settings (i.e. they will
have high fidelity).
2. When D is honest:
(a) When R is also honest, the faithfulness of the simulation fol-
lows from the completeness and privacy properties of the real
protocol. Privacy implies that the adversary A1 cannot tell
that it is actually participating in a sharing of |0〉 rather than
the dealer’s state, and completeness means that R in the real
protocol gets a state with high fidelity to that received by R
in the ideal protocol.
(b) When R is a cheater, S does not get S from T T P until the
reconstruction phase. Then he applies the ideal interpola-
tion circuit to extract the |0〉 state used during the verification
phase, swaps S with |0〉, then runs the ideal interpolation cir-
cuit backwards. Since the ideal interpolation circuit only acts
on shares of the honest players, S is capable of performing
these operations without tipping off A1 to the fact that it is in
a simulation. By the completeness property of the real proto-
col and the no-cloning theorem, the residual state left over af-
ter the ideal interpolation circuit (i.e., the state of the cheaters)
has almost no correlation to the data shared using the circuit,
so swapping in S and running the circuit backwards gives us
a state with high fidelity to the state that would have resulted
from sharing S directly with the same A1. Thus, the simula-
tion is faithful in this case as well.
We have essentially proved Theorem 3.4.
3.3 Additional Properties
Two-level sharings produced by the same dealer (using the proto-
col above) have some additional properties, which will be useful for
multi-party computation. First of all, notice that there is no prob-
lem in tracking the sets B,B1, ..., Bn incrementally across various
invocations of the protocol for the same dealer, and so we assume
below that these sets are the same for different sharings from the
same dealer.
1. Some operations can be applied transversally to valid sharings.
Applying the linear operation (x, y) 7→ (x, y + bx) (denoted
c-Xb) to all shares of two sharings effectively applies c-Xb
to the shared states. Similarly, applying the Fourier rotation
transversally changes the sharing to the dual code and applies a
logical Fourier rotation. Finally, measuring all shares of a valid
sharing in the computational basis and applying classical decod-
ing yields the same result as measuring the shared state. Thus,
players can measure without exchanging quantum information.
2. The dealer can additionally use the protocol to prove to all play-
ers that the system he is sharing is exactly the state |0〉: the
ancillas he uses in this case will all be sharings of |0〉 (instead
of
∑
|a〉). The verification step is the same as before, except
now players verify that the reconstructed codeword at the top
level interpolates to 0. Similarly, the dealer can prove that he is
sharing a state
∑
a
|a〉. This will be useful for sharing ancillas
in the MPQC protocol.
4. LOWER BOUND FOR VQSS
LEMMA 4.1. No 4-player VQSS scheme tolerates one cheater.
Proof: Suppose such a scheme exists. Consider a run of the proto-
col in which all players behave perfectly honestly until the end of
the sharing phase, at which point one (unknown) player introduces
an arbitrary error. However, an honest “receiver” Ruth, given ac-
cess to the state of all players, must still be able to recover the
shared state. Thus, the joint state of all players constitutes a four-
component QECC correcting one error. However, no such code ex-
ists, not even a mixed-state one, by the quantum Singleton bound [16].
✷
The optimality of our VQSS scheme is an immediate corollary,
since any protocol tolerating n/4 cheaters could be used to con-
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ALGORITHM 1. Simulation for VQSS (Protocol 1)
• Sharing/Verification phase
– If D is a cheater, S must extract some system to send to T T P:
1. Run Sharing and Verification phases of Protocol 1, simulating honest players. If D is caught cheating, send “I am
cheating” from D to T T P .
2. Choose n− 2t honest players not in B and apply ideal interpolation circuit to extract a system S.
3. Send S to T T P.
– If D is honest, S does not need to send anything to T T P, but must still simulate the sharing protocol.
1. Simulate an execution of the Sharing and Verification phases of Protocol 1, using |0〉 as the input for the simulated
dealer D′.
2. Choose n − 2t honest players (they will automatically not be in B since they are honest) and apply the ideal
interpolation circuit to extract the state |0〉.
3. The honest D will send a system S to T T P .
Note: Regardless of whether D is honest or not, at the end of the sharing phase of the simulation, the joint state of the
players’ shares is a tree that is (essentially) 2-GOOD in both bases, and to which the ideal interpolation operator has been
applied. Let I be the set of n− 2t honest players (not in B or C) who were used for interpolation.
• Reconstruction phase
– If R is a cheater, S receives the system S from T T P . S runs the interpolation circuit backwards on the positions in
I , with S in the position of the secret. S sends the resulting shares to R.
– If R is honest, the cheaters send their corrupted shares to S . These are discarded by S .
In both cases, S outputs the final state of A1 as the adversary’s final state.
struct a four-person protocol tolerating one cheater by having each
participant simulate n/4 players in the original protocol:
THEOREM 4.2. No VQSS scheme for n players exists which tol-
erates all coalitions of ⌈n/4⌉ cheaters.
Note that we have only proved the impossibility of perfect VQSS
protocols. However, the quantum Singleton bound still holds when
exact equality is replaced by approximate correctness, and so in
fact even statistical VQSS schemes are impossible when t ≥ n/4.
5. MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION
In this section we show how to use the VQSS protocol of the pre-
vious section to construct a multi-party quantum computing scheme.
First, we give a modified VQSS protocol. At the end of the protocol,
all players hold a single qupit. With high fidelity, either the dealer
will be caught cheating or the shares of all honest players will be
consistent in both the computational and Fourier bases, i.e. there
is no set B of “apparent cheaters”. We then apply fault-tolerant
techniques to achieve secure distributed computation.
5.1 Top-Level Sharing Protocol
We will now restrict attention to protocols tolerating t < n/6
cheaters, instead of t < n/4 cheaters as before. Thus, we take
n = 6t + 1 for simplicity, and as before we set δ = 2t (thus
δ′ = 4t). We will work with the CSS code C given by V = V δ and
W = W δ
′
. Recall that this is the CSS code for which there exist
nearly-transversal fault-tolerant procedures (Section 1.3). Our goal
is to share a state so that at the end all shares of honest players lie
in CC = V (q)C ∩ F
⊗nW (q)C .
The new scheme is given in Protocol 3. The idea is that the pre-
vious VQSS scheme allows distributed computation of linear gates
and Fourier transforms on states shared by the same dealer. It also
allows verifying that a given shared state is either |0〉 or
∑
|a〉. The
players will use this to perform a distributed computation of the en-
coding gate for the code C. Thus, the dealer will share the secret
system S, as well as δ states
∑
|a〉 and n−δ−1 states |0〉. Players
then apply the (linear) encoding gate, and each player gets sent all
shares of his component of the output. As before, the main lemmas
are soundness and completeness of the protocol:
LEMMA 5.1 (SOUNDNESS). At the end of the sharing phase,
the system has high fidelity to “either the dealer is caught or the
players’ shares S1...Sn lie in CC”.
LEMMA 5.2 (COMPLETENESS). When D is honest, on pure
state input |ψ〉, the shared state will have high fidelity to span {E|ψ〉}C
(i.e. will differ from E|ψ〉 only on the cheaters’ shares).
Note the dealer can also prove that he has shared a |0〉 state (by
showing that his input is |0〉).
5.2 Distributed Computation
Given the protocol of the previous section, and known fault-
tolerant techniques, there is a natural protocol for secure multi-
party computation of a circuit: have all players distribute their in-
puts via the top-level sharing (Protocol 3); apply the gates of U
one-by-one, using the (essentially) transversal implementation of
the gates described in Section 1.3; then have all players send their
share of each output to the appropriate receiver. See Protocol 4.
The only sticking point in the analysis is that the fault-tolerant
procedures require some interaction when measuring a shared state.
All players measure their share and broadcast the result, applying
classical decoding to the resulting word. If the errors occurring in
the measured ancilla were somehow correlated or entangled with
errors in the real data, one could imagine that measuring and broad-
casting them might introduce further entanglement. However, this
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PROTOCOL 3 (TOP-LEVEL SHARING). Dealer D takes as input a qupit S to share.
• 1. (Distribution) The dealer D:
(a) Runs the level 2 VQSS protocol on input S.
(b) For i = 1, ..., δ: Runs level 2 sharing protocol to share state ∑
a
|a〉 (see Remark 2 in Section 3.3)
(c) For i = 1, ..., n− δ − 1: Runs level 2 sharing protocol to share state |0〉 (see Remark 2 in Section 3.3)
Denote the n shared systems by S1, ..., Sn (i.e. S1 corresponds to S, S2, ..., Sδ+1 correspond to
∑
a
|a〉 and
Sδ+2, ..., Sn correspond to |0〉). Note that each Si is a two-level tree, and thus corresponds to n components in the
hands of each player.
2. (Computation) Collectively, the players apply the Vandermonde matrix to their shares of S1, ..., Sn. (If D is honest
then system Si encodes the i-th component of an encoding of the input S).
3. For each i, all players send their shares of Si to player i, who decodes them (as per Protocol 2).
• Quantum Reconstruction Input to each player i is the share Si and the identity of the receiver R.
1. Each player i sends his share Si to R.
2. R outputs D(S1, ..., Sn) and discards any ancillas (D is the decoding algorithm for C).
PROTOCOL 4 (MULTI-PARTY QUANTUM COMPUTATION).
1. Input Phase:
(a) For each i, player i runs Top-Level Sharing with input Si.
(b) If i is caught cheating, then some player who has not been caught cheating yet runs Top-Level Sharing (Protocol 3), except
this time with the one-dimensional code span{EC|0〉} (i.e. he proves that the state he is sharing is |0〉). If the sharing
protocol fails, then another player who has not been caught cheating runs the protocol. There will be at most t iterations
since an honest player will always succeed.
(c) For each ancilla state |0〉 needed for the circuit, some player who has not been caught cheating yet runs Top-Level Sharing
(Protocol 3), with the one-dimensional code span{ECδ |0〉} or span
{
ECδ′ |0〉
}
, as needed. If the protocol fails, another
player performs the sharing, and so forth.
2. Computation Phase: For each gate g in the circuit, players apply the appropriate fault-tolerant circuit, as described in
Section 1.3. Only the measurement used in Degree Reduction is not transversal. To measure the ancilla:
(a) Each player measures his component and broadcasts the result in the computational basis.
(b) Let w be the received word. Players decode w (based on the scaled Reed-Solomon codeW δ′ ), and obtain the measurement
result b.
3. Output Phase: For the ith output wire:
(a) All players send their share of the output wire to player i.
(b) Player i applies the decoding operator for C and outputs the result. If decoding fails (this will occur only with exponentially
small probability), player i outputs |0〉.
will not be a problem: on one hand, any errors will occur only in the
cheaters’ shares, and so provide nothing beyond what the cheaters
could learn themselves; on the other hand, the honest players will
discard all the information from the broadcast except the decoded
measurement result (each honest player performs the decoding lo-
cally based on the broadcast values, so all honest players obtain the
same result). Again, the cheaters can do this themselves.
LEMMA 5.3. Suppose that all inputs and ancillas are shared
at the beginning via states in CC . Then the result of applying the
protocol for a given circuit U , and then sending all states to an
honest decoder R is the same as sending all states to R and having
R apply U to the reconstructed states.
THEOREM 5.4. For any circuit U , Protocol 4 is a statistically
secure implementation of multi-party quantum computation as long
as t < n/6.
Proof: The proof of this is by simulation, as before. The key obser-
vation is that when the simulator S is controlling the honest players,
the adversary cannot tell the difference between the regular proto-
col and the following ideal-model simulation:
1. S runs the input phase as in the protocol, using |0〉 as the in-
puts for honest players. In this phase, if any dealer is caught
cheating, S sends “I am cheating” to the T T P on behalf of that
player.
2. S “swaps” the cheaters’ inputs with bogus data |0〉, and sends
the data to the T T P . That is, he applies the interpolation circuit
to honest players’ shares to get the various input systems Si (for
i ∈ C), and then runs the interpolation circuit backwards, with
the state |0〉 replacing the original data.
3. S now runs the computation protocol with the adversary on the
bogus data. (Because no information is revealed on the data, the
adversary cannot tell this from the real protocol.)
4. S receives the true computation results destined to cheating
players from T T P.
5. S “swaps” these back into the appropriate sharings, and sends
all shares of the ith wire to player i (again, he does this only for
i ∈ C).
The proof that this simulation succeeds follows from the security of
the top-level sharing protocol and the previous discussion on fault-
tolerant procedures. ✷
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6. OPEN QUESTIONS
Given our results, the most obvious open question is if MPQC
is possible when n/6 ≤ t < n/4. Another natural direction of
research is to find a VQSS protocol with zero error. For example,
the techniques of [5] for the classical case do not seem to apply to
the quantum setting. Finally, one can ask what tasks are achiev-
able when we allow cheating players to force the abortion of the
protocol (usually called an “optimistic protocol”).
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